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943 
COMMENT 
Frontier Feudalism: Agrarian Populism Meets Future 
Interest Arcana in the Land of Manifest Destiny 
The Cole Porter classic, “Don’t Fence Me In,” asks the heavens (or 
maybe the state) for unrestricted “land, lots of land under starry skies 
above.”1 A full-throated acclamation of “frontier living,” Porter’s tune also 
evokes the boundless potential of achievement and ownership so ensconced 
in American mythology. Echoing since the clamor of “Manifest Destiny,”2 
the urge to expand remains a persistent national theme. It also finds 
actualization at the state level; indeed, Oklahoma exemplifies such an urge, 
its archetypal “Boomers and Sooners”3 the human embodiments of an 
unquenchable desire to set one’s stake in the land.  
But such quixotic imagery must find its realization in the framework of 
the law—the law of property, to be specific. Hardly a rugged, rough-hewn 
creation of the commoner, America’s property law remains a distillation of 
feudal English concepts and doctrines.
4
 And the scheme is hardly stable. 
While it persists, in part or in whole, across the United States, it has 
weathered virtually unflagging broadsides for decades.
5
 The effects are 
                                                                                                             
1. Bing Crosby & the Andrews Sisters, Don’t Fence Me In, on BING CROSBY, THE 
DEFINITIVE COLLECTION (Geffen Records 2006). Cole Porter wrote the song in 1934, and the 
song was made famous by Bing Crosby and the Andrew Sisters ten years later. See Don’t 
Fence Me In, TCM (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.tcm.com/this-month/article/161339%7C0/ 
Don-t-Fence-Me-In.html. The opening stanza is:  
   Oh, give me land, lots of land under starry skies above 
   Don’t fence me in! 
   Let me ride through the wide-open country that I love 
   Don’t fence me in! 
   Let me be by myself in the evening breeze,  
   And listen to the murmur of the cottonwood trees; 
   Send me off forever, but I ask you please 
   Don’t fence me in! 
2. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 562, 
562 n.38 (2005) (noting that Manifest Destiny was viewed as “essentially democratic—not 
simply in the old Jeffersonian tradition of enlarging the empire of liberty, but in a 
supercharged moral sense, stressing America’s duties to spread democratic values and 
institutions”).  
3. See W. DAVID BAIRD & DANNEY GOBLE, OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY 141–48 (2008). 
4. See ROBERT LAURENCE ET AL., A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE 
INTERESTS vii (LexisNexis, 3d ed. 2012).  
5. For just a sampling of such criticism, see 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (overhauling the 
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mixed: while regular criticism may keep law in tune with prevalent societal 
policy, property law increasingly looks like something mangled by a 
flailing cleaver rather than an even-handed scalpel.
6
 Classifications and 
rules are stricken wholesale, with little analysis or discussion beyond a rote 
recitation of shibboleths like “grantor’s intent,” “simplicity,” “efficiency,” 
and “alienation.”7 When filtered through plodding legislative reform, these 
policy proposals may end up translated into an incoherent patchwork of 
medieval detritus, hardly the goal of comprehensive model laws and 
treatises.
8
 
                                                                                                             
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and replacing it with a “wait-and-see” approach that 
applies equally to contingent and vested remainders); 1 JOHN. A. BORRON, JR., SIMES AND 
SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (3d ed. 2002) (detailing the demise, induced by 
courts or legislatures, of future interests doctrines like the Rule in Shelley’s Case, the 
Doctrine of Worthier Title, and the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders); 
D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 3 (2009) (proposing a model property law that eliminates feudal future interest 
doctrines and streamlines future and present interests); J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Contingent 
Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13 
(1958) (calling for the elimination of allegedly illusory distinctions between contingent 
remainders and executory interests); T. P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513 (2003) (offering policy recommendations that radically simplify 
the Anglo-American future interest regime); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the 
Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729, 729–35 
(1972) (naming deficiencies of the common-law property system and proposing reforms in 
the pursuit of greater simplicity and clarity). 
6. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. (AM. LAW. INST. 1940) (detailing feudal-era 
future interest classifications and doctrines, while offering assessments of where American 
statutes stood vis-à-vis these topics), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (offering wholesale reforms of future 
interest doctrines and vast changes to classificatory schemes, despite the failure of states to 
recognize some or all of these proposed reforms).  
7. See, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 25.5 (“The Rule of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders is not recognized as part of 
American law.”); see also Katheleen Guzman, Response: Worthier for Whom?, 68 OKLA. L. 
REV. 779 (2016) (noting frustration with the Restatement (Third)’s terse dismissal of future 
interest doctrines like the Doctrine of Worthier Title). 
8. For instance, some jurisdictions may retain one future interest doctrine such as the 
Rule in Shelley’s Case, while abrogating another, such as the Doctrine of Worthier Title. 
Oklahoma, for example, has abrogated the Rule in Shelley’s Case by statute, 60 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 41 (2011), while the fate of the Doctrine of Worthier Title is less clear. See Guzman, supra 
note 7, at 801 (noting that the doctrine has been applied in numerous Oklahoma cases). 
Compare this situation with, for instance, Barros’s comprehensive model law for present 
estates and future interests. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67–72. 
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This Comment aims to reevaluate facets of our property law, with a 
particular focus on future interests and the feudal-era doctrines that operate 
alongside them. Two major points frame the discussion. First, this 
Comment focuses on the law of Oklahoma, both in the spirit of the adage, 
“land law is local,”9 and in light of the state’s unique land history. 
Oklahoma is fertile ground for a reevaluation of feudal-era concepts, 
offering a burst of fresh air for seemingly stagnant and stale ideas.
10
  
Second, the arguments below are as much procedural as they are 
substantive. That is, the following conclusions, while important, are not 
offered as definitive; rather, the goal is to challenge legal scholarship’s 
hasty (and at times stubborn) abandonment of legal rules that have endured 
for generations.
11
 Perhaps forces like the Restatement (Third) will emerge 
triumphant in the battle of ideas, but the battle ought to be fought 
regardless. 
Part I of this Comment briefly examines Oklahoma’s future interest law 
in light of the broad criticisms leveled against the Anglo-American system, 
with a close examination of the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent 
remainders (hereinafter, “the destructibility doctrine”).12 Part II—the bulk 
of this Comment—delves deeply into recent scholarship and recommended 
property reforms. While interesting suggestions arise, the reforms overall 
divest the grantor of control of her property—ironic, given that the purpose 
                                                                                                             
9. 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1 (3d ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Sept. 2016) (“Land, having a fixed location, is controlled in all 
respects . . . by the law of the place where it is located.”).  
10. Perhaps new wineskins for old wine (or something like that), to flip the old parable 
on its head.  
11. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 780, 801 (agreeing with the contention that suggestions 
made by authorities such as the Restatement should never be blindly accepted). 
12. By way of prologue, this Comment concentrates heavily on the destructibility 
doctrine for a reason. Much of modern property law and debate centers around the primacy 
of the grantor’s intent—deeds should be construed in accordance with such intent, even 
where that intent might seem incongruous with prevailing social policy. See 2 RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 
2011) (“If, on the basis of the evidence, the donor’s intention is found to prefer a result that 
is inconsistent with public policy, the donor’s intention controls the meaning, though not 
necessarily the effect, of the donative document.”). Here, this Comment argues that 
abrogating the destructibility doctrine, often in the name of grantor’s intent, actually does a 
disservice to that intent by divesting the grantor of power over her land, such as the power to 
alienate it in accord with her wishes. See infra Part II. Hence, while the observations in this 
Comment are salient for other future interests doctrines and classificatory areas of common-
law property, much of the argument is couched in an analysis of the destructibility doctrine 
and critiques of scholars who call for its abrogation.  
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of the reforms is more often than not to promote alienability and effectuate 
the grantor’s intent. Part III returns to Oklahoma—this time an historical 
Oklahoma of the 1880s–1910s—looking for political and ideological 
undercurrents from which to cull new policy rationales that might salvage 
feudal-era property concepts now under siege. When conceptualized 
through a non-feudal lens, these time-tested property concepts may indeed 
strengthen grantor rights and promote alienability. That is, even if 
alienability and grantor’s intent are significant—and correct—policies 
contextualizing and inspiring American property law, efforts at efficiency, 
simplification, and radical reform may not actually advance these 
underlying policy goals;
13
 instead, reframing old ideas, rather than 
abrogating them, may better effectuate these policies. Oklahoma, with its 
unique land history and sociopolitical viewpoints, offers an alternative to 
hastily discarding pillars of property law that have persisted for centuries. 
While medieval England may no longer justify some of these principles, 
America’s heartland just may.14  
I. What’s Up with Future Interest Doctrine in Oklahoma? 
The Anglo-American system of property law, largely derived from 
feudal-era England, has weathered sustained criticism for decades.
15
 
Scholars have aimed at one area in particular—future interest classifications 
and doctrines.
16
 An outgrowth of the “bundle of sticks” idea at the heart of 
property law,
17
 temporal division of property is a fundamental facet of the 
Anglo-American understanding of property.
18
 But with the benefits of 
multigenerational property arrangements come broader concerns tied to 
concepts of land alienability and marketability, the importance of the 
                                                                                                             
13. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 795 (“[I]n the centuries since assorted earlier vesting 
(thus transfer-supporting) future interest rules have arisen, Anglo-American jurisprudence 
has demonstrated but slight concern for their furtherance, especially when to do so would 
arguably contravene grantor’s intent. In other words, efficiency is not enough.”).  
14. To be sure, in many ways this Comment accepts the importance of alienability and 
effectuating the grantor’s intent as two major policies undergirding property law. The 
suggestion, however, is that abrogation often fails to achieve the goal of strengthening these 
twin justifications.  
15. See supra note 5. 
16. Id. 
17. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (9th ed. 2008); 
see also LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. 
18. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 514–15 (noting that “temporal division of ownership . . . is 
at the heart of modern property transactions”).  
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grantor’s intent, and the critical balance between the “reign of the dead 
hand” and the authority of the original landowner.19  
In particular, scholars have repeatedly questioned the classificatory 
scheme for future interests,
20
 along with four specific doctrines that police 
these interests: the Rule Against Perpetuities,
21
 the Doctrine of Worthier 
Title,
22
 the Rule in Shelley’s Case,23 and the destructibility doctrine.24 
Frequently, “grantor’s intent” and “alienability of land” appear as the major 
animating forces behind these attacks, with “efficiency” and “simplicity” 
often tagging along.
25
  
                                                                                                             
19. These themes—alienability and grantor’s intent—appear frequently in discussions of 
property law and policy. Sometimes they antagonize each other, while at other times they 
exist in harmony. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFER §11.3 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting the primacy of donative intent while 
also acknowledging that, in cases of ambiguity, the donor is presumed to have favored 
public policy’s preference for land alienability); BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193 (noting 
that the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders “obviously defeats the intent 
of the grantor” and may only be justified because it increases land alienability, albeit 
haphazardly). 
20. See Barros, supra note 5; Dukeminier, supra note 5; Waggoner, supra note 5. 
21. The classic formulation of the rule is as follows: “No interest is good unless it must 
vest, if at all, no later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.” JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray ed., 
4th ed. 1942).  
22. The Doctrine of Worthier Title, put simply, is the law against remainders in the heirs 
of a grantor. BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 1601.  
23. The Rule in Shelley’s Case is the inverse of the Doctrine of Worthier Title, acting to 
prevent remainders in a grantee’s heirs. Id. § 1541.  
24. “A contingent remainder is destroyed unless it vests at or before the expiration of the 
preceding estate.” LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 43. The rule derives from the feudal 
concept of “seisin,” a hazy concept typically described as reified possession. See 1 TIFFANY, 
supra note 9, §§ 20, 22, 326. Feudal law demanded that the seisin not be in abeyance—
effectively, that the land not be unoccupied. Id. § 326. If the livery of seisin (the physical 
actualization of seisin) could not be transferred to the remainderman upon the expiration of 
the supporting present estate—because, for example, the remainderman had yet to satisfy the 
contingency of his remainder—the estate would return to the original grantor, who held a 
reversion. Id. This situation also stemmed from the fact that contingent remainders, at 
common law, were viewed as “mere possibilities of estates, less concrete than present estates 
or even vested remainders.” See id. The doctrine has come under fire for its roots in these 
feudal concepts. See, e.g., Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 280–81 (N.M. 
1979) (noting that the doctrine “has been renounced by virtually all jurisdictions in the 
United States” and that it often frustrates grantor’s intent in the name of historical 
justifications).  
25. See Barros, supra note 5; Gallanis, supra note 5; Waggoner, supra note 5. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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The Restatement (Third) offers a telling representation of where reform 
efforts presently stand. The Restatement (Third) jettisons the finer 
distinctions between future interests, instead offering two discrete 
categories: vested and contingent remainders.
26
 It exchanges the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities for a “wait-and-see” approach, voiding 
interests that fail to vest or terminate in a specific timeframe.
27
 And it 
wholly abrogates all of the feudal future interest doctrines listed above, 
insinuating that they have no place in American law.
28
 More broadly, the 
Restatement (Third) also declares the preeminence of grantor’s intent, 
coupled with a societal preference for alienability.
29
 Together, these twin 
policy pillars hem in deed construction, such that the grantor’s will tends to 
prevail—and where the grantor’s will is vague, he or she is presumed to 
have favored maximum alienability of the land.
30
  
State laws, such as those of Oklahoma, fit within this prescriptive 
framework. In some ways, Oklahoma occupies a middle ground between 
holding fast to the old common law and allowing itself to be swept up in 
reformist fervor. Examples of this ideological middle ground can be found 
throughout both its statutes and common law. First, Oklahoma has 
statutorily abrogated the Rule in Shelley’s Case, following both the trend 
among states and the recommendation of the Restatement (Third).
31
 Second, 
while Oklahoma has enacted statutory reform to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities for trusts,
32
 the classic Rule itself remains largely intact—likely 
due in no small part to its constitutional enshrinement.
33
 In the common-law 
realm, a more nuanced scheme of future interests still operates, recognizing 
executory interests as well as various contingent and vested remainders.
34
  
                                                                                                             
26. See 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 
25.1–25.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
27. See id. §§ 27.1–27.3. This contrasts with the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, 
where particular future interests are void ab initio. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 99–
107. 
28. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 
16.2–16.3, 25.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
29. See id. §§ 11.2–11.3.  
30. Id. 
31. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 41 (2011); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 16.2 (noting that the clear majority of states have abolished 
the Rule in Shelley’s Case).  
32. See 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.47(C) (Supp. 2015).  
33. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32 (“Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of 
a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or 
entailments ever be in force in this State.”).  
34. See, e.g., 60 OKLA. STAT. §§ 29–30, 35 (2011).  
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But here is where matters get murkier. For instance, the fate of the 
Doctrine of Worthier Title is not altogether clear.
35
 More uncertain still is 
the fate of the destructibility doctrine. While two cases are often cited
36
 for 
the proposition that Oklahoma has abrogated the destructibility doctrine—
Whitten v. Whitten
37
 and Beatty v. Miley
38—these cases represent at most a 
weak repudiation of a doctrine operating in the wings of state law. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that failing to recognize the rule does not 
always further the legal academy’s purported goals of increasing 
alienability and, more significantly, honoring the grantor’s intent. 
Whitten is typically cited as the first case purportedly abrogating the 
destructibility doctrine.
39
 In Whitten, the grantor, Julia A. Morris, granted 
life estates to her son and daughter—Calvin Lee Clifford Morris and 
Francis Elizabeth Whitten—by two separate warranty deeds executed in 
1934.
40
 The life estates were followed by a remainder in the heirs of the 
body of each grantee.
41
 In 1948, Ms. Morris executed two quitclaim deeds 
purporting to transfer her reversion in each parcel to her children, such that 
they would now hold an estate in fee simple absolute rather than merely a 
life estate.
42
 The conveyances, then, look like this: 
                                                                                                             
35. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 801 (suggesting that while Oklahoma has applied the 
Doctrine in case law, it has not had an adequate opportunity to determine whether the 
Doctrine truly persists in Oklahoma); see also Beamer v. Ashby, 1951 OK 111, ¶ 8, 231 
P.3d 668, 669 (“[The court] ha[s] not had occasion to adopt or reject the ‘worthier title’ 
doctrine, and it is not necessary to do so in this case.”). 
36. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 209 n.7 (citing Whitten v. Whitten and Beatty v. 
Miley for the proposition that Oklahoma has eliminated the destructibility doctrine). 
37. 1950 OK 93, 219 P.2d 228.  
38 . 1951 OK 184, 233 P.2d 269. 
39. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 209 n.7. 
40. Whitten, ¶ 2, 219 P.2d at 230.  
41. Id. The Rule in Shelley’s Case had been abrogated by statute at this point. See 60 
OKLA. STAT. § 41 (2011) (“When a remainder is limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of 
a person to whom a life estate in the same property is given, the persons who, on the 
termination of the life estate, are the successors or heirs of the body of the owner for life, are 
entitled to take by virtue of the remainder so limited to them, and not as mere successors of 
the owner for life.”). 
42. Whitten, ¶ 3, 219 P.2d at 230. It is somewhat unclear from the case opinion whether 
Ms. Morris meant to give her reversions in all parcels solely to her daughter. The opinion 
quotes language from each quitclaim deed—but the language pertains only to Ms. Morris 
conveying over her reversion to Francis Whitten, not Calvin Morris. More likely, the court 
simply quoted one of the quitclaim deeds to illustrate the conveyance, implying that the 
other quitclaim deed included the same language, but to Calvin Morris.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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1934: OA for life, remainder in A’s heirs of the body43 
1948: OA and her heirs 
Under the destructibility doctrine, the second deeds would have given 
Ms. Morris’s children a fee simple absolute by way of merger.44 That is, 
each child held a life estate prior to the 1948 deeds, which conveyed Ms. 
Morris’s reversion to the children. Thus, the life estate and reversion would 
merge, destroying the contingent remainder in each child’s bodily heirs and 
resulting in each child holding a fee simple absolute.  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, chose a different route. While 
the Court rejected the argument that the remainders were vested in the 
children of Elizabeth Whitten and Calvin Morris—given that an 
individual’s “heirs” cannot be ascertained until his or her death,45 the 
remainders were contingent—it held that Ms. Morris’s reversion, rather 
than the remainders, was the subordinate future interest in the 
conveyances.
46
  
Whitten represents Oklahoma’s first crack in the common-law 
destructibility doctrine. Under the common-law rule, all contingent 
                                                                                                             
43. In the event that no bodily heir of A exists, the property would revert back to O. Thus, 
O holds a reversion.  
44. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 197.  
45. Whitten, ¶¶ 11–13, 219 P.2d at 231–32. 
46. Specifically, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned: 
[I]t does not follow . . . that because the fee title, except to the extent of the life 
estate, remained vested in the grantor that the latter's deed to the life tenant 
conveyed an indefeasible fee, thus defeating the contingent remainder. Since 
the effect of the [1934] conveyance was to create a contingent remainder in the 
entire fee, the only alienable or assignable estate remaining in the grantor was 
that of reversion which was subordinate to the contingent remainder because 
its enjoyment is dependent upon the failure of the event upon the occurrence of 
which the remainder was to vest. . . . Under the circumstances, the deeds of 
March 9, 1948, were ineffective to disturb the existence of the remainders 
theretofore created and therefore could not enlarge into a fee the life estates 
then enjoyed by the grantees. The only effect of such deeds was to carry to the 
grantees the reversion theretofore vested in the grantor. 
Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 219 P.2d at 232 (emphasis added). For support, the Court cites language from a 
Virginia case:  
“Upon a grant or devise of a particular estate limited to determine upon the 
happening of an event which is certain to happen, with a contingent remainder 
over, there remains in the grantor or devisor a reversion, subject to be defeated 
by the happening of the contingency upon which the remainder is conditioned.” 
Id. ¶ 14, 219 P.2d at 232 (quoting Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 S.E. 802, 813 (Va. 1930) 
(emphasis added)).  
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remainders require the support of a freehold estate.
47
 Once this freehold 
estate terminates (whether by natural expiration or by merger with another 
interest), the unvested remainder, suddenly exposed and unsupported, is 
destroyed.
48
 In Whitten, however, the dynamic flipped. Whereas at common 
law, the remainder in the children’s heirs would have been destroyed by the 
1948 quitclaim deeds, in this case the children ended up with a life estate 
and the reversion, prevented from merging by the contingent remainder in 
their bodily heirs.  
A year later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Beatty v. Miley.
49
 In 
Beatty, Lillee Pearl Watt conveyed land by warranty deed to her husband, 
William M. Watt, in 1925.
50
 The deed specified that William would hold 
the land for so long as he and Lillee were married; upon the end of their 
marriage, by death or otherwise, the land would go to either Lillee’s 
children or their children, should they be deceased. In 1930, William 
conveyed the land back to Lillee by warranty deed.
51
 William died in 1932, 
and Lillee’s three children brought a quiet title action thereafter.52 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Whitten controlled, and thus William’s 
conveyance of his present interest back to Lillee did not give her a fee 
simple absolute.
53
 The children’s remainder (called “contingent” by the 
court) blocked the merger of the present interests.
54
  
But Beatty’s pertinence to the destructibility doctrine is suspect from the 
outset. In Beatty, the primary conveyance could be written as follows:  
OA for so long as he and O remain married, and when O and A 
are no longer married, to O’s children.55 
                                                                                                             
47. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193; Douglass L. Mann, Recent Decision, Future 
Interests—Contingent Remainders—Destructibility by Merger, 49 MICH. L. REV. 762 (1951).  
48. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193.  
49. Beatty v. Miley, 1951 OK 184, 233 P.2d 269. 
50. Id. ¶ 15, 233 P.2d at 272.  
51. Id.  
52. Id. ¶ 16, 233 P.2d at 273. 
53. Id. ¶¶ 19, 233 P.2d at 273–74. 
54. Id. ¶ 23, 233 P.2d at 273. 
55. The pertinent language of the conveyance is as follows:  
I, Lillee Pearl Watt . . . do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto William 
M. Watt, my husband [land] . . . to hold said land during the time that the 
relation of husband and wife exists between the Parties hereto and when such 
relationship ceases because of death of either party or from other causes, this 
property shall go in equal parts to children of [Ms. Watt], provided if any of 
[her] children should die leaving children of their own, such children would 
take the interest of [the] deceased child. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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At the time of the conveyance, Ms. Watt had three living children—
ascertainable individuals.
56
 Given that the children’s right of possession 
was not conditioned on an uncertain event, they likely held vested 
remainders subject to open (or subject to partial defeasance).
57
 The court, 
however, held that the remainders were contingent, applying Whitten to 
conclude that the latter conveyance (from Mr. Watt to Ms. Watt) did not 
result in merger.
58
 Of course, had the remainders been vested in the living 
children, Ms. Watt would have had no reversion with which Mr. Watt’s 
interest could merge. Regardless of what interest Mr. Watt held,
59
 the 
remainder interest here was not contingent, and thus the case does not speak 
to the destructibility doctrine. 
This leaves Whitten. First, it must be noted that Whitten’s result runs 
contrary to the stated policy behind abrogation of the destructibility 
doctrine. While the rule “tends to increase the alienability of land,” critics 
attack the rule based on its perceived frustration of the grantor’s intent.60 
                                                                                                             
Id. ¶ 15, 233 P.2d at 272.  
56. Id. ¶ 16, 233 P.2d at 273; see also Jacob F. May, Jr., Note, Future Interests: Vesting: 
Supplanting Limitations: Adverse Possession, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 103 (1953).  
57. A vested remainder subject to open is a remainder in a class where one of the class 
members is born and ascertainable, and there is either no condition precedent or the class 
member has satisfied the condition. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 114; see also May, 
supra note 56, at 104 (“The test of vesting in interest is not whether the prior particular 
estate upon which the remainder is dependent is subject to termination upon a contingency, 
but rather, whether or not, throughout its continuance, the remainderman and his heirs ‘have 
the right to the immediate possession, whenever and however the preceding freehold estates 
may determine.’” (quoting LEWIS M. SIMES, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 30 (2d ed. 1951)).  
58. Beatty, ¶¶ 19, 23, 233 P.2d at 273–74. 
59. It is somewhat unclear from the language of the conveyance what Mr. Watt held. He 
was given a present, possessory estate that he could hold until his marriage with Ms. Watt 
ended. This estate was not potentially infinite in duration, since he was only able to hold it 
for the length of the marriage—which was, at maximum, the length of his life or that of Ms. 
Watt. But the estate could also end prior to Mr. Watt’s death—were he and Ms. Watt to 
divorce, he would no longer have the right to possess. Mr. Watt, then, had a life estate, 
which was subject to defeasance (either a life estate determinable or a life estate subject to a 
condition subsequent). Regardless, the children held a vested remainder, as three were 
ascertainable at the time the deed was executed.  
60. Mann, supra note 47, at 764. Mann also references an oft-quoted passage by Justice 
Holmes to explain why the destructibility doctrine ought to be done away with:  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the reign of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past. 
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Yet it is the grantor’s intent that is being frustrated here by failure to apply 
the rule.
61
 Ms. Morris likely intended to give her two living children estates 
in fee simple absolute by merger through her second transfer of her 
reversion. Instead, the court prevented these interests from merging by 
virtue of the contingent remainder in the bodily heirs of each child. Under 
Whitten, the contingent remainder is given preference above all other 
property interests, as well as above the grantor’s intent. If the intent of the 
grantor is to be preferred above all else,
62
 it would seem that the ephemeral 
interests of persons unascertained (perhaps not even in existence yet) 
should give way to the actions of the original grantor.
63
  
 Moreover, Whitten does not directly speak to the following scenario:  
OA for life, then, if B is a lawyer, to B. 
(At the time of A’s death, B is not a lawyer) 
From the conveyance, A would hold a life estate, B a contingent 
remainder, and O a reversion. Upon A’s death, the question becomes: Who 
is entitled to present possession of the estate? Under the destructibility 
doctrine, B’s remainder would be destroyed and O would receive present 
possession by function of his reversion because B failed to become a lawyer 
by the time of the life estate’s expiration. Without the destructibility 
doctrine, the result is more ambiguous. One option would be to give O 
present possession subject to defeasance; thus, O would receive a fee 
simple subject to executory limitation, and B would hold a springing 
executory interest.
64
 While O’s interest would be potentially infinite, B 
could terminate it at his leisure: simply become a lawyer, and the land is 
his.  
                                                                                                             
Id. (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897)); see also Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 281 (N.M. 1979) (quoting 
the same passage).  
61. Mann, supra note 47, at 764.  
62. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
donative document is the donor’s intention.”).  
63. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 32 (“A contingent remainder was not 
considered a very substantial interest at common law. Hence, a contingent remainder was 
not alienable inter vivos . . . .”).  
64. See id. at 156–57 (examining statutory reforms to the destructibility doctrine and 
concluding that, post-destructibility, deeds will result in the former remainderman holding 
an executory interest, with the grantor possessing a defeasible fee after the expiration of the 
life estate); see also Guzman, supra note 7, at 797.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
954 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:943 
 
 
Interestingly enough, Whitten may not support this result. In Whitten, the 
reversion was “subordinate to the contingent remainder because its 
enjoyment is dependent upon the failure of the event upon the occurrence of 
which the remainder was to vest.”65 In other words, Ms. Morris’s reversion 
could ripen into a present, possessory estate if the event conditioning the 
remainder, bodily heirs, “failed”—implying the death of the children—such 
that the remainder did not vest. This “wait-and-see” approach is arguably 
appropriate in this context. The destructibility rule holds that a contingent 
remainder must vest at or before the expiration of its preceding estate.
66
 If 
the termination of the preceding estate is understood as the death of the life 
tenant, rather than the merger of the life estate with a reversion, then 
Whitten’s result evades rather than abrogates the destructibility doctrine.  
Granted, this is a stretch: merger at common law is one way to terminate 
a life estate, such that a contingent remainder would be destroyed by this 
termination if it had failed to vest in time.
67
 And reading this decision 
narrowly requires setting aside the idea that merger would represent the 
“expiration” of the preceding estate.68 But under this reading, Whitten 
would not be a wholesale rejection of destructibility. In fact, Whitten would 
simply stand for the idea that the original deed, overall, is given preference: 
the contingent remainder was created with a preceding life estate, and 
assessing whether the remainder vests waits until this life estate “dies off,” 
subsequent transfers notwithstanding. Regardless, the state of the 
destructibility doctrine in Oklahoma is ambiguous at best, and absent 
explicit statutory abolition, it stands to reason that the doctrine could remain 
alive and active—or at least ripe for a renaissance.  
Broadly speaking, then, Oklahoma’s future interest law might be 
characterized as intermediate or moderate—situated somewhere between 
the Restatement (Third)’s radical reforms and the traditional common law 
of feudal England. Specific areas of the law appear unsettled or vague, 
calling for renewed discussion of the policies that best embody Oklahoma’s 
underlying sociopolitical values. Part III will discuss these values, along 
with the notion that common-law doctrines, when conceptualized in a non-
feudal light, may both speak to Oklahoma’s land heritage and effectuate the 
policies of alienability and grantor’s intent framing modern reform efforts. 
                                                                                                             
65. Whitten v. Whitten, 1950 OK 93, ¶ 14, 219 P.2d 228, 232 (emphasis added).  
66. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 192. 
67. See id. § 197. 
68. Perhaps we could conceptually differentiate the “termination” of a preceding estate—
say, through merger and forfeiture—with the “expiration” of the preceding estate—the 
natural, foreordained death of the life tenant.  
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But the strength of these efforts must be tested and examined. That is, what 
are the primary effects of contemporary policy proposals on common-law 
notions of real property and the owner’s relationship to it—and do they 
accomplish that which they set out to achieve? Part II attempts to ask and 
answer these important questions.  
II. Modern Property Law—Recommendations and Problematics 
Modern property law recommendations have focused on stripping away 
the so-called relics of feudalism in favor of a simplified, straightforward 
approach to estates and future interests. Here this Comment examines two 
proposals: Professor Gallanis’s Uniform Future Interests Act69 and 
Professor Barros’s model law of estates and future interests.70 Both share 
substantial similarities, aiming to pare down the current array of present and 
future interests into a smaller galaxy of options for grantors. But in the 
quest for a more transparent, streamlined system, both scholars leave 
property owners with fewer ways to dispose of their land—and arguably 
less power over the fee simple absolute central to modern conceptions of 
ownership.
71
  
A. Gallanis 
Professor Gallanis proposes five major reforms to simplify the American 
scheme of future interests.
72
 He begins with a familiar refrain, lambasting 
the “late-medieval baggage” of future interest law that “revels in unhelpful 
complexity, elevates form over substance, and frustrates the very 
transactions it should facilitate.”73 In its place, Professor Gallanis offers his 
Uniform Future Interests Act, which jettisons the cumbersome 
classifications and substantive arcana of the future interest regime while 
preserving the “temporal division of ownership that is at the heart of 
modern property transactions.”74 
His first reform allows full alienability of future interests, regardless of 
classification.
75
 At common law, only vested interests could be alienated 
                                                                                                             
69. See Gallanis, supra note 5. 
70. See Barros, supra note 5. 
71. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (“Today, because modern caselaw and 
statutes favor the creation of the fee simple absolute, the fee simple absolute is the default 
estate.”).  
72. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 515.  
73. Id. at 514.  
74. Id. at 515.  
75. Id. 
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inter vivos,
76
 whereas contingent remainders were treated as “mere 
possibilities” not warranting recognition as actual property interests.77 This 
reform follows the modern trend: the majority of states, Oklahoma 
included, treat contingent remainders as alienable.
78
 Alienability aligns with 
the modern view that contingent remainders, like vested remainders, 
amount to extant property rights, rather than possibilities.
79
 While Professor 
Gallanis acknowledges the real difference between vested and contingent 
future interests, he nonetheless contends that this difference is reflected 
through pricing—the market for contingent remainders may be scant, but 
interest holders should still be able to alienate, even if only for paltry 
sums.
80
 
The second reform considers the issue of failure in the future interest 
context.
81
 Regarding failure, Professor Gallanis aims at a specific target: the 
treatment of executory interests following a defeasible fee.
82
 Executory 
interests are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities; where the Rule voids 
an executory interest, the result can differ depending on whether the 
conveyance gave a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a 
condition subsequent.
83
 Take the following:  
Conveyance 1: OA for so long as a church is maintained on 
the premises, and upon a church not being maintained, to B. 
Conveyance 2: OA on condition that a church is maintained on 
the property; but if a church is not maintained, to B. 
In both examples, B holds an executory interest. The Rule Against 
Perpetuities would void the interest in both examples. The results, however, 
differ: whereas in Conveyance 1, A is left with a fee simple determinable, in 
Conveyance 2, A is left with a fee simple absolute. Professor Gallanis 
                                                                                                             
76. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 27–32. 
77. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 515–16.  
78. Id.; see also 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 25.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (holding future interests to be freely alienable). 
Oklahoma treats contingent remainders as alienable. See 60 OKLA. STAT. § 30 (2011).  
79. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 519–20. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 520. Professor Gallanis also addresses issues of acceleration, which are beyond 
the scope of this Comment and, thus, will not be addressed.  
82. Id. at 521.  
83. Id.  
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would treat the conveyances the same: upon the Rule Against Perpetuities 
voiding B’s interest, A would hold the property in fee simple absolute.84  
Gallanis’s third reform abolishes three future interest rules: the 
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of 
Worthier Title.
85
 Professor Gallanis is conclusory in this section—a 
common theme across scholarship addressing these rules
86—calling on 
those states that have yet to abrogate the rules to do so in the name of 
modernity and grantor’s intent.87  
The fourth reform substantially changes the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
creating a “super-alienability” doctrine that voids all future interests unless 
they terminate within ninety years of their creation.
88
 This changes the Rule 
Against Perpetuities from a filter discriminating against unvested future 
interests to a broader oversight mechanism, balancing a preference for free 
alienability and marketability against the so-called reign of the dead hand.
89
 
Thus, Professor Gallanis provides a legal backstop to prevent conveyances 
from tying up land.
90
 
                                                                                                             
84. Professor Gallanis offers several justifications for this reform:  
First, Anglo-American law has long had a strong policy in favor of the vesting 
of estates. Allowing A to retain the property outright avoids the potential 
divestiture of A’s possessory estate. Second, allowing A to retain the property 
outright promotes marketability. Potential buyers will be more likely to 
purchase the property from A because there is no chance of future divestment. 
Third, the result gives effect to the grantor’s probable intention: namely, that a 
fee simple limited by an executory interest should continue until the executory 
interest takes effect . . . . Fourth and last, the result accords with the basic rule 
on failure: future interests that fail are treated as if they had not been created. 
Id. at 522–23. 
85. Id. at 529.  
86. See, e.g., 2,3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS §§ 16.2–16.3, 25.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (proffering perfunctory statements that 
destructibility doctrine, Doctrine of Worthier Title, and Rule in Shelley’s Case are not 
recognized as part of American law).  
87. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 530–48.  
88. Id. at 565. Gallanis’s proposal adopts a “wait-and-see” approach to future interests: 
their validity is assessed ninety years after their creation. If they have failed to vest or 
terminate by that period, they are voided. See id.  
89. Id. at 559–60.  
90. Id. at 558–59. Pointing to the increasing legal similarity between vested and 
contingent future interests, Professor Gallanis heralds this reform:  
[A] rule against the remoteness of vesting makes sense only if there is a good 
reason to distinguish all categories of vested future interests from future 
interests that are contingent. Yet the distinction between a contingent interest 
and an interest that is vested subject to defeasance is often purely formal, 
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The fifth and final reform appears the most radical, yet still flows 
naturally from Professor Gallanis’s preceding recommendations. He 
proposes eliminating the entire classificatory scheme for future interests, 
assimilating all future interests—whether in the grantor or grantee—under a 
unified “future interest” heading.91 Professor Gallanis offers four 
justifications, drawn from the preceding work of Professor Waggoner.
92
 
First, the complexity of the future interest classification scheme alone is 
reason to jettison it.
93
 Second, the system is artificial, often failing to reflect 
the substance of a conveyance.
94
 Third, the system offers unearned benefits 
to those who can master it, making it a strategic tool.
95
 Finally, the scheme 
values classification above all else, spilling into—and potentially 
suffocating—broader questions of construction and enacting the grantor’s 
intent.
96
 In light of these rationales (and the fact that an increasing number 
of jurisdictions treat vested and contingent remainders almost identically), 
Professor Gallanis takes Professor Waggoner’s scholarship one step further 
by recommending a single future interest for all—grantor and grantee, 
vested and contingent.
97
 
B. Barros 
Professor Barros proposes a broader reform of property law than 
Professor Gallanis, focusing on the entire system of present and future 
interests. But he also proceeds with more caution, aware of the difficulty of 
introducing radical change into a system that has endured for centuries, in 
one form or another.
98
 Prompted by the Restatement (Third)’s “cogent and 
                                                                                                             
except in the jurisdictions that treat them differently for purposes of 
alienability, acceleration, or destructibility. . . . [T]hose differences in treatment 
are outmoded. Thus, there is little point in a rule separating defeasibly vested 
interests from contingent ones. . . . [W]e can restrict the dead hand by providing 
a direct limit on the duration of future interests. Controlling the dead hand does 
not require us to use the blunt instrument of a rule against the remoteness of 
vesting. 
Id. at 560.  
91. Id. at 565.  
92. Id. at 561 (citing Waggoner, supra note 5). 
93. Id.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 562–63.  
98. Barros, supra note 5, at 24–28. 
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elegant simplification of the system of estates and future interests,”99 
Professor Barros declares his mission statement:  
Th[e] complexity [of our system of land ownership] is 
unnecessary. Many of the distinctions between the types of 
interests are based on accidents of English legal history that are 
not relevant to modern law. Five steps . . . could be taken to 
drastically simplify the system of estates and future interests 
while having a negligible impact on real-world legal issues.
100
 
Much like Professor Gallanis, Professor Barros draws inspiration from 
American property law’s (perceived) needless complexity and antiquated 
concepts.
101
 Primarily, he seeks simplification: according to Barros, 
property systems should convey information easily and clearly, and the 
American system currently fails to do so.
102
 Moreover, Professor Barros 
aims to clear out “unnecessary underbrush that has accumulated in law over 
the past eight hundred years,” while retaining the bulk of the current 
system.
103
 Professor Barros makes his recommendations in the form of a 
model law, suggesting the benefits of uniformity in an area that has 
historically been marked by heterogeneity across states and locales.
104
 
Professor Barros’s first two suggestions are relatively uncontroversial.105 
In his third and fourth suggestions, however, Professor Barros calls for one 
                                                                                                             
99. Id. at 5.  
100. Id. at 18.  
101. Id. at 21–22. 
102. Id. at 21.  
103. Id. at 21–22. 
104. Professor Barros expounds on the issue of uniformity in discussing his choice of a 
model law:  
The abstract desirability of uniformity in law is the subject of much academic 
discussion . . . . In property law, uniformity might be desirable in some contexts 
but not others. On the one hand, land is quintessentially local, and some areas 
of property law (particularly conveyancing) often reflect local conditions and 
customs. In areas of property law where there is a lack of consensus on the best 
approach to a particular issue, having different states follow different 
approaches also may provide a laboratory of ideas to provide data on their 
effects. . . . In the estates and future interests area, a case can be made for 
uniformity because standardization in forms of ownership can better convey 
information and reduce transaction costs.  
Id. at 25–26. 
105. First, he recommends abolishing the fee tail across the United States—a modest 
proposal given that so few states still continue to recognize it. Second, Professor Barros 
would abolish the distinction between shifting and springing executory interests, given that 
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defeasible fee, merging the fee simple determinable, fee simple subject to 
condition subsequent, and fee simple subject to an executory limitation into 
one present estate—the Fee Simple Defeasible.106 This merged estate offers 
two significant features. First, all future interests attached to it, whether in 
the grantor or grantee, are treated as contingent.
107
 The major ramification 
of this decision is that all future interests attached to a defeasible estate 
become subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
108
 This runs contrary to 
tradition, where the power of termination and the possibility of reverter in 
the grantor were not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
109
 
Additionally, where the Rule Against Perpetuities voids the future interest, 
the current holder of the present estate becomes the owner of a fee simple 
absolute, rather than the owner of a defeasible fee.
110
 
The second unique feature of Professor Barros’s Fee Simple Defeasible 
is its treatment of future interests in the grantor. At common law, a grantor 
could retain one of two future interests when conveying a defeasible fee: a 
power of termination or a possibility of reverter.
111
 The possibility of 
reverter took effect immediately upon the grantee, in possession of the 
present estate, breaching the condition attached to the land.
112
 The power of 
termination, however, lacked automatic enforcement—the grantor could 
choose to exercise this “power” or could simply decline and allow the 
grantee to continue in possession.
113
 Under Professor Barros’s regime, the 
distinctions between the two would vanish, with one contingent future 
interest replacing the common-law grantor interests.
114
 More importantly, 
this new future interest takes on the properties of the power of 
termination—the grantor, holding the contingent future interest, may end 
the defeasible estate only by asserting his or her power to terminate in 
writing.
115
 
Professor Barros’s future interest recommendations—collectively, his 
fifth reform overall—hold equal significance and share some 
                                                                                                             
there is little legal difference between the two beyond categorization and naming 
convention. See id. at 18.  
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 39.  
108. Id. at 45.  
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 46.  
111. Id. at 41. 
112. BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 281. 
113. See id. § 241.  
114. Barros, supra note 5, at 41. 
115. Id. at 42.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/5
2018]       COMMENT 961 
 
 
commonalities with those of Professor Gallanis. Professor Barros would 
install a simplified future interest regime differentiating on the basis of 
vesting.
116
 In part this stems from his treatment of all future interests as 
freely alienable, abrogating the common law’s previously significant 
distinction between vested and contingent interests.
117
 But unlike Professor 
Gallanis, Professor Barros retains the vested-contingent dichotomy, basing 
his decision on the intuitive logic behind the distinction, as well as the 
broader pragmatism undergirding his incremental approach to reform.
118
 
Even so, Professor Barros offers a radical departure from the long-
enduring, Anglo-American future interest regime. First, like Professor 
Gallanis, Professor Barros jettisons the destructibility doctrine, the Rule in 
Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title, invoking his “clearing 
the underbrush” rationale for this change.119 While Professor Barros retains 
much of the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, he does make minor 
changes based on vesting, subjecting future interests in the grantor to the 
Rule while exempting the traditionally-susceptible vested remainder subject 
to open.
120
 Finally, Professor Barros’s model law prefers alienability and 
vesting through rules of construction: ambiguous conveyances will be 
interpreted to create vested future interests, and contingent future interests 
are interpreted in a manner that would hasten vesting.
121
 Thus, in Professor 
Barros’s ideal future interest regime, we are left with two categories of 
future interests: vested future interests (which may be indefeasibly vested, 
subject to partial divestment, or subject to total divestment) and contingent 
future interests.
122
 Vested interests are in “an ascertained person and not 
subject to a condition precedent,” whereas contingent interests are “either 
in an unascertained person or . . . subject to a condition precedent.”123 
These future interests operate in a landscape stripped of feudal doctrines 
and emphasizing systemic alienability.
124
 
  
                                                                                                             
116. Id. at 50.  
117. Id. at 49.  
118. Id. at 52–53.  
119. Id. at 58–62.  
120. Id. at 58–59. At common law the vested remainder subject to open was subject to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 107. 
121. Barros, supra note 5, at 62–63.  
122. Id. at 20.  
123. Id. at 50.  
124. Id. at 30–31.  
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C. Problematics for These Modern Approaches 
Pause for a moment and consider the systems proposed by Professors 
Barros and Gallanis. Both scholars undoubtedly accomplish their 
overarching goals: simplification, modernization, and promotion of 
alienability. Professor Gallanis makes the more radical recommendations: 
his system distills down to one future interest—period—which is fully 
alienable in life or at death, its only limitation a “super-alienability” 
doctrine mandating that it become possessory within ninety years of its 
creation. Professor Barros, though writing on the entire Anglo-American 
property scheme, takes a more modest approach: unlike Professor Gallanis, 
he retains the Rule Against Perpetuities with little change, and he 
distinguishes future interests based on vesting.  
But both scholars create a substantially similar landscape in several 
ways. First, alienability reigns supreme, whether clothed in the raiment of 
“grantor’s intent” or standing on its own two feet. Even if the market for 
certain future interests is weak or non-existent, the interests remain 
alienable—it is the interest holder’s prerogative whether to barter them 
away, regardless of the price garnered. Second, simplicity remains at the 
forefront of the schema. Both scholars whittle down the categories of future 
interests substantially, eliminating a great deal of nuance for the sake of 
clarity and ease of understanding. Third, where changes are made, the 
grantee tends to reap the benefits. Both systems subject future interests in 
the grantor to the Rule Against Perpetuities (or its successor), and under 
this framework, the grantee often ends up holding in fee simple absolute—
even if the grantor originally conveyed a defeasible fee or less-tangible 
future interest. The systems are undoubtedly easier to follow than the 
common-law regime, and some of Professors Barros and Gallanis’ 
suggestions are well taken.
125
 But these suggestions are not unencumbered 
by their own difficulties.  
                                                                                                             
125. For instance, Professor Gallanis’s detailed consideration of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is the type of in-depth discussion often missing from debates about, say, the 
destructibility doctrine. It may be worthwhile to reform this law of alienability, perhaps by 
extending the perpetuities period beyond the classic “lives in being plus 21 years.” 
Moreover, as Professor Barros recommends, protecting all vested remainders from the Rule 
would seem to make sense, given the conceptual difference between a right that is vested 
and one that is contingent. That being said, grantor’s interests ought to remain immune from 
the Rule, owing to the idea that the ultimate locus of power ought to be with the original 
owner. Subjecting the grantor’s reversion, for instance, to the Rule would have the systemic 
effect of shifting power away from the conveyer—who was the person in charge of 
dispensing that power in the first place. 
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1. The Defeasibility Reforms 
Take Professor Barros’s reforms to the defeasible fees. Recall that he 
proposes one defeasible fee—the Fee Simple Defeasible—to replace the 
tripartite, common-law scheme. At common law, the following 
conveyances operate differently:  
OA for so long as alcohol is never consumed on the premises. 
OA on condition that alcohol is never consumed on the 
premises; if it is, back to O. 
Under the first conveyance, the grantee holds a fee simple determinable, 
and the grantor retains a possibility of reverter. The possibility of reverter is 
self-actualizing: upon the condition being breached, the possessory right 
instantly flows back to the grantor—no action needed.126 The second 
conveyance, however, gives the grantee a fee simple subject to condition 
subsequent, with the grantor retaining a power of termination. Here, upon 
the grantee breaching the condition, nothing happens automatically: the 
grantor may choose to invoke her power of termination, or not.
127
 The 
grantee’s possession remains rightful until the grantor acts.128 
This difference does not survive Professor Barros’s model law. In his 
scheme, these defeasible estates—along with the fee simple subject to an 
executory limitation—become one. Moreover, the “future interest” held by 
the grantor operates like a power of termination, with the possibility of 
reverter effectively scrubbed from the legal rolls. The most glaring issue 
with this is its potential disregard for the perennial justification of such 
reforms: grantor’s intent. Consider the following:  
CONVEYANCE 1: Grantor Bob would like his nephew, Phil, to 
have some land for his 21st birthday. But Bob knows as well as 
the next guy that Phil is a bit of a deadbeat—he’s slovenly, prone 
to poor judgment, and an all-around louse. But Bob is hopeful 
that giving Phil something to work on and own himself might 
instill some much-needed work ethic in him. So he crafts the 
following conveyance: “I, Bob, give to you, Phil, Greenacre, to 
hold in fee simple for so long as you never have a kegger on the 
grounds.”  
                                                                                                             
126. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 281.  
127. See id. § 241. 
128. See id. 
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CONVEYANCE 2: Bob again, but this time he’s looking to give 
his other nephew, Bill, something. Bill is an upstanding gent, a 
real cracker-jack of a guy (nothing like Phil). He’s bound for law 
school and destined for greatness—the scion of the family. 
While Bob still wants to make sure his land is taken care of in 
the proper fashion, he is not terribly worried about Bill and his 
judgment. So he crafts the following conveyance: “I, Bob, give 
to you, Bill, Blueacre, to hold in fee simple on the condition that 
you never have a kegger on the grounds; if you do, I’ll take 
Blueacre back.”  
At common law, the differences between Bob’s conveyances matter. In 
Conveyance 1, Bob gets the land back as soon as Phil throws his 
(inevitable) kegger. But in Conveyance 2, Bob has options: if Bill screws 
up, Bob can choose to let it slide (everyone makes mistakes, right?) or take 
back the land. Maybe Phil showed up and had the party without Bill’s 
knowledge. Regardless, Bob can rest on his laurels and deliberate as to Bill, 
whereas Phil has already reached his proverbial third strike (on the first 
kegger thrown).  
Of course, all this evaporates in the Barros scheme. These two 
conveyances—regardless of wording, and certainly regardless of 
background narrative—become a Fee Simple Defeasible grant. Bob retains 
a contingent future interest, subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and not 
self-actualizing. Perhaps with Bill this presents no problem—the new 
conveyance looks quite a bit like the common-law one. But the problem lies 
with Phil, who suddenly has a much better shot of holding onto Greenacre 
no matter his choices. Were Phil to breach the condition, Bob must act. And 
Phil could embroil the two in protracted litigation and gamesmanship in an 
effort to hold onto the property. 
More broadly, the reforms deprive Bob from the outset of even the 
option to craft Conveyance 1. Now, if he wants to make a conditional 
conveyance to anyone, he is stuck with considerably attenuated power: he 
can give the grantee a defeasible present estate, but his retained future 
interest may be void from the start, and if it does manage to survive, it is 
effectively nothing more than a power to litigate. This for the man who 
began as “king of the castle,” master of the Fee Simple Absolute that was 
his domain.
129
 Perhaps Bob will just hold onto the land, rather than give 
                                                                                                             
129. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–3 (noting that the fee simple absolute is the 
fullest complement of rights and “most complete form of ownership” available at common 
law).  
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away so much. And so we end up with a perverse (and unintended) result: 
less market-wide alienation of land stemming from a policy predicated on 
alienation.  
Professor Barros’s reforms would also have tangible, real-world impact, 
as illustrated by a recent Oklahoma case, Ator v. Unknown Heirs.
130
 In 
1954, Thelma Ator and her husband gifted a fee simple determinable to the 
Owasso Independent School District by warranty deed.
131
 As a fee simple 
determinable, the gift was conditional, and the deed stated that the 
conveyance’s sole purpose was to enable Owasso School District to 
maintain a football program on the land.
132
 Owasso School District 
complied with the condition for forty years, building a football stadium and 
playing its games on the parcel.
133
 However, the high school varsity team 
ceased playing its games on the parcel in 1994, and no district football 
teams played games on the parcel after September 2001; instead, the district 
permitted a private organization, the Future Owasso Rams, to use the parcel 
and its facilities.
134
  
When Thelma Ator died intestate, her son and sole heir filed a quiet title 
action, arguing that the parcel was rightfully his given the district’s breach 
of the condition.
135
 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed with Mr. 
Ator, finding that the land had reverted back to Thelma Ator when the 
school district stopped complying with the conditions of the deed.
136
  
While the nature of the conveyance was undisputed, its classification is 
significant, particularly considering Professor Barros’s suggested reforms. 
Remember that the fee simple determinable belongs in the larger class of 
                                                                                                             
130. 2006 OK CIV APP 120, 146 P.3d 821. 
131. Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 146 P.3d at 823–24.  
132. The deed stated, in pertinent part:  
[T]his conveyance . . . is solely for the construction and maintenance on said 
property of a football playing field and stadium for the use and benefit of the 
students of said School District, for so long as said real property shall be used 
for such purposes as a part of a regularly organized and fully scheduled 
program of football practice and playing . . . . [A]nd . . . if at any time after the 
date hereof, [Owasso School District] shall fail to comply fully with the terms 
of this deed or said agreement or observe the spirit thereof, the grant shall 
become null and void and the full fee simple title to said property shall revert to 
and vest in [Mr. and Mrs. Ator], their heirs and assigns forever. 
Id. ¶ 3, 146 P.3d at 823–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
133. Id. ¶ 4, 146 P.3d at 824. 
134. Id. ¶¶ 5–7, 146 P.3d at 824–25. 
135. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9, 146 P.3d at 823, 825.  
136. See id. ¶¶ 13, 18, 146 P.3d at 826–27. 
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defeasible fees;
137
 typically created with language of duration, the fee 
simple determinable leaves the grantor with a possibility of reverter, which 
operates immediately upon the conveyance’s condition being broken.138 
Thus, when the Owasso school district stopped playing football on the 
gifted parcel, it violated the terms of Thelma Ator’s deed, thereby losing 
title to the land. In other words, the school district wrongfully possessed 
that land once it ceased football operations on it.
139
 
Now apply Professor Barros’s model to this conveyance. In its entirety, 
Professor Barros’s reforms would leave Thelma Ator and her heirs with 
nothing, as her possibility of reverter would be subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. Ms. Ator’s conveyance, simply stated, is as follows: “Thelma 
Ator to Owasso School District for so long as the district plays football on 
the property (and upon football not being played there, back to Ator).” The 
language of duration indicates that Owasso school district now holds a fee 
simple determinable, and Thelma Ator a possibility of reverter. But this 
possibility need not vest within the lives in being plus twenty-one years. 
Theoretically, Owasso could continue to play football on this parcel 
forever. Thus, Ms. Ator’s future interest, under Professor Barros’s scheme, 
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and, consequently, is void. Indeed, if 
Thelma Ator had wanted to condition the land grant on football operations 
alone, she is left with virtually no tools to do so; unless she ensures that her 
possibility of reverter will vest within twenty-one years of the lives in being 
contemporaneous with the grant, it will invariably run afoul of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities.  
Even if Professor Barros’s expansion of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
were not applied to Thelma Ator’s conveyance,140 Ms. Ator still encounters 
some difficulties. Under the Barros scheme, all defeasible fees merge into 
the Fee Simple Defeasible,
141
 the consequence being that future interests 
held by the grantor are treated as powers of termination, rather than as 
possibilities of reverter.
142
 In other words, under Barros’s reforms, Owasso 
school district’s present estate—its right to possess the parcel granted to 
them by Thelma Ator—would continue until the holder of Ms. Ator’s 
                                                                                                             
137. See 2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 44 (AM. LAW INST. 1936).  
138. See id. 
139. See Ator, ¶¶ 13, 16–17, 146 P.3d at 826–27. 
140. Professor Barros’s application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to future interests in 
the grantor accompanying a defeasible present estate is not retroactive—the only provision 
in his model law not applied retroactively. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67.  
141. Id. at 41.  
142. Id. at 42.  
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contingent future interest asserts his or her power of termination in 
writing.
143
 Unlike Professor Barros’s expansion of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, this reform is applied retroactively.
144
 Moreover, equitable 
defenses typically inapplicable to the fee simple determinable (such as 
estoppel) are made applicable to the newly-merged Fee Simple Defeasible 
and its accompanying future interests.
145
  
The consequences for Ms. Ator would be significant. Ms. Ator’s interest 
would be transformed into a mere power of termination, rather than the 
possibility of reverter she intended to retain. As a result, Owasso school 
district would be in rightful possession of the gifted property unless and 
until Ms. Ator or her heirs asserted the power to terminate. But, at this 
point, Owasso could choose to embroil the parties in prolonged litigation, 
and it would have additional equitable defenses at its disposal that could 
potentially thwart Ms. Ator’s original future interest. Compare this with the 
state of affairs in the actual case: upon the school district ceasing football 
operations on the gifted property, title to the land reverted back to Ms. Ator 
automatically. Owasso school district became a trespasser, not a rightful 
possessor—and the possibility of rightful ownership through adverse 
possession was at least fifteen years away.
146
 Thus, the likelihood that Mr. 
Ator would have failed in his quiet title action under a Barros regime, as 
compared with his actual victory under current Oklahoma law, is 
substantially greater. This notion is particularly troubling given that 
Oklahoma has traditionally treated the power of termination as a much 
weaker interest than the possibility of reverter.
147
 
                                                                                                             
143. See id.; see also LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 (“[W]hen O creates a fee 
simple on condition subsequent, he is not entitled to possession until he demands 
possession.”).  
144. See Barros, supra note 5, at 67.  
145. Id. at 43.  
146. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 93(4) (2011) (applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for 
most property actions, apart from enumerated exceptions).  
147. Ludwig v. William K. Warren Found., 1990 OK 96, ¶¶ 7–8, 809 P.2d 660, 662 
(recognizing that, at Oklahoma common law, the power of termination was inalienable, 
while the possibility of reverter is alienable); Frensley v. White, 1953 OK 79, ¶ 5, 254 P.2d 
982, 984 (“The estate remaining in the grantor after the conveyance of [a fee simple 
determinable] is a possibility of reverter which he may convey, it being considered an 
interest in the land. . . . Next, there is the fee estate upon condition subsequent which is a fee 
simple except that it may be terminated by the grantor by re-entry upon the happening of 
some possible event, subsequently. What remains to the grantor after the conveyance of such 
an estate is a power . . . which is not an interest in the land and is not sufficiently in esse to 
be subject to conveyance.” (emphasis added)). But see 60 OKLA. STAT. §§ 29–30, 40 (2011) 
(abolishing the common-law rule against alienation of powers of termination).  
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Professor Barros’s defeasible fee reforms, then, present concerns both in 
theory and in fact. They leave the powers of the grantor significantly 
attenuated: the landowner has fewer ways to convey her land and less of an 
interest in that land once conveyed. While the future interests 
accompanying the defeasible fees may be increasingly similar in operation 
under the law, including Oklahoma law, the common-law distinctions 
continue to matter, as evinced by Ator. And eliminating these distinctions 
skews the system towards grantees at the expense of grantors. In some 
ways, this runs counter to the modern preference for grantor’s intent.148 
While the new system may be simplified and more streamlined, it carves 
out many of the privileges typically associated with ownership, favoring 
macro-alienability while weakening individual authority over real property.  
2. The Feudal Future Interest Rules 
Both Professors Gallanis and Barros propose eliminating the 
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of 
Worthier Title.
149
 Further, both scholars make changes to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.
150
 In many ways, these are merely the denouement to a 
decades-long erosion; while the Rule Against Perpetuities remains intact in 
some form across the country,
151
 feudal future interest rules have fared 
much worse.
152
 But these doctrines have not garnered the robust defense 
(or, perhaps the requiem) that they have earned. And while their feudal 
roots may now be obsolete, the concepts themselves deserve a second look, 
especially in particular states and property regimes. Though the following 
discussion focuses on the destructibility doctrine for this second look, it 
offers observations likewise salient to debates over the Rule in Shelley’s 
Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title.  
Principally, the destructibility doctrine states that a contingent remainder 
must vest before or at the time of the preceding estate.
153
 If it does not meet 
                                                                                                             
148. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE INTENT §§ 
11.1–11.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
149. See Barros, supra note 5, at 59–62; Gallanis, supra note 5, at 529-48. 
150. See Barros, supra note 5, at 58–59; Gallanis, supra note 5, at 549–60. 
151. Gallanis, supra note 5, at 550–53 (noting that the Rule Against Perpetuities, in some 
form, persists in most states). 
152. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, §§ 209, 1563, 1612 (detailing the state of the 
destructibility doctrine, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title across 
jurisdictions).  
153. Id. § 193.  
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this condition, it is destroyed.
154
 For example, consider the following 
conveyance:  
OA for life, then if B is twenty-one to B155 
O, the grantor, conveys to A, the grantee, a life estate, giving A the present 
right to possess the land for the duration of A’s life. B receives a future 
interest, and more specifically, a contingent remainder—a remainder 
because it follows a life estate, and contingent because it is conditioned on 
an event that may not occur.
156
 At the expiration of the life estate—likely, 
A’s death—B may take the interest if B is twenty-one. Under the 
destructibility doctrine, if B is not twenty-one, his interest is destroyed, and 
the land returns to O, or to her heirs or devisees, as a function of O’s 
reversion.  
Different rules apply, however, where the destructibility doctrine is not 
in force. If B is not twenty-one at the expiration of A’s life estate, B may 
still take the interest, provided he turns twenty-one at some point. The 
present right to possess will likely belong to the grantor, but at a price. Now 
the grantor effectively holds a defeasible fee, with the contingent remainder 
acting as an executory interest. Should B turn twenty-one at some point, he 
will gain O’s original fee simple absolute. This poses several problems, 
particularly when considered in light of the justifications for abolishing the 
destructibility doctrine.  
The rationale for abolition of this doctrine most frequently turns on 
property law’s ever-familiar friend—“grantor’s intent.”157 But this 
argument is not as ironclad as it may first appear. Consider once more the 
conveyance above: the argument in favor of preserving B’s contingent 
remainder would turn on an idea of what O wanted in the first place. That 
is, readers of the grant assume that O wanted B to turn twenty-one—full 
stop. If B is not yet twenty-one at the time A’s life estate expires, preserving 
B’s contingent remainder in the hopes that it may vest later will work to 
effectuate O’s original intent. But consider the following scenario:  
Harry owns Blackacre in fee simple absolute. He’s a self-made 
millionaire at the age of 24—no small feat—and Blackacre 
represents the culmination of this fortune: a sprawling property 
                                                                                                             
154. Id.  
155. Assume for all examples that O holds a fee simple absolute. 
156. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 111.  
157. See Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 281 (N.M. 1979); BORRON, JR., 
supra note 5, § 193. 
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that stands as an American Versailles. But Harry hails from 
humble beginnings—the son of farmers, Bob and Betty. Bob and 
Betty, elderly and ailing, still live in their modest farmhouse on 
their modest acreage. Harry decides to pay back his parents. 
Knowing he will be out of the country indefinitely on business, 
he starts drafting the following conveyance:  
“I, Harry, convey to Bob and Betty, Blackacre for life . . .” 
But Harry pauses. Given his plans and his parents’ advanced 
age, he would like to ensure that Blackacre is cared for after their 
deaths. So he adds an additional clause:  
“ . . ., then if he graduates law school, to my brother, Fred.”  
Fred is Harry’s older brother, who has been struggling for years 
to get through law school. Harry is hopeful that this “carrot” will 
finally push Fred over the finish line. But if Fred cannot graduate 
by the time that his parents’ life estate expires, then good 
riddance: Harry would rather reassess his options for the 
property.  
Admittedly, this hypothetical is long-winded and somewhat far-
fetched—but intentionally so, as the intent of the grantor is not always so 
clear, either on the face of the conveyance or from contextual clues. 
Without Harry’s direct testimony, a court may very well construe Harry’s 
intent in error, believing him to have wanted Fred to graduate law school no 
matter what. Of course, Harry’s intent is effectuated under the 
destructibility doctrine: if, at the time of the life estate’s expiration, Fred 
has not yet graduated law school, Fred’s contingent remainder is destroyed, 
and Harry reacquires the land via his reversion. But absent application of 
the destructibility doctrine, Fred’s remainder remains. While Harry will get 
the present right to possess Blackacre, owing to his reversion, Fred can 
divest Harry of this right—and, indeed, hold Blackacre in fee simple 
absolute—as soon as he graduates law school.  
This result poses numerous issues. First, the result is particularly 
perverse if Harry relied on the destructibility doctrine in crafting his 
conveyance. Not every state has abolished the doctrine,
158
 and modern-day 
                                                                                                             
158. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 193 (noting that Oregon and Florida continue to 
recognize the doctrine).  
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conveyances may still be drafted in its shadow.
159
 But both Professors 
Gallanis and Barros make their policy reforms retroactive.
160
 Professor 
Barros notes that such retroactivity is not troubling given that, in many 
cases, it often will comport with the grantor’s intent.161 However, as the 
example above demonstrates, the grantor’s intent is seldom self-evident, 
and retroactive application of destructibility reform may act to frustrate, 
rather than effectuate, the grantor’s intent—irrespective of whether the 
grantor relied on an extant (or redacted) destructibility doctrine.  
The second problem is one of math. A basic tenet of property law is that 
the grantor may not convey more than she holds.
162
 For example, if O holds 
a life estate, she may not convey away a fee simple absolute;
163
 she may, of 
course, convey a life estate to another individual, but that present estate will 
terminate with O’s death.164 In the same sense, property transfers must 
distill down to a “1 = 1” transaction. If O holds a fee simple absolute and 
seeks to convey part of it, every piece of the fee simple “pie” must be 
accounted for.
165
 To illustrate, consider the following scenario:  
Deed 1: OA for life 
In Deed 1, O begins with a fee simple absolute. Seeking to convey away 
part of this, O gives a life estate to A. The remaining piece of O’s fee simple 
absolute is accounted for in O’s reversion. Mathematically speaking, this 
results in “Fee Simple Absolute = Life Estate + Reversion.” Contrast with 
the following conveyances:  
Deed 2: OA for so long as beer is never consumed on the 
premises; if beer is consumed, to B. 
                                                                                                             
159. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 5, at 64–65 (acknowledging the difficulties with 
applying reforms retroactivity given grantors’ expectations at the time of the conveyance).  
160. Professor Barros applies all of his reforms, save his Rule Against Perpetuities 
changes, retroactively. See id. at 64–66. Professor Gallanis uses the same tactic. See 
Gallanis, supra note 5, at 569. 
161. Barros, supra note 5, at 66. 
162. This principle may be described as nemo dat quod non habet (“No one transfers (a 
right) that he does not possess”) or nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse 
haberet (“No one can transfer to another a greater right than he himself might have”). See 
Legal Maxims, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1932, 1934 (10th ed. 2014). 
163. See BORRON, JR., supra note 5, § 195 (describing fraudulent transfer of fee by life 
tenant). 
164. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. 
165. See id. at 17 (“Mathematically speaking, the sum of the present and any future 
interests must equal the fee simple absolute.”).  
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Deed 3: OA for life, remainder in B. 
Deed 4: OA for life, then if B graduates law school, to B. 
Deed 2 has O, holding in fee simple absolute, conveying a defeasible fee 
(the fee simple subject to an executory limitation) to A. Should A violate the 
condition attached to his fee simple, the entire parcel of land will go to B, 
who holds an executory interest in fee simple absolute. Mathematically, this 
is “Fee Simple Absolute = Fee Simple Subject to Executory Limitation + 
Executory Interest.” Deed 3 and 4 represent variations on Deed 1 in which 
O, the grantor, has included a future interest to a third party. In Deed 3, B 
holds a vested remainder, as it is not conditioned upon any event happening 
and is given to a person born and ascertained.
166
 In this example, O holds 
nothing—the land is certain (or virtually certain) to go to B upon the 
expiration of A’s life estate. Thus, the conveyance equation becomes “Fee 
Simple Absolute = Life Estate + Vested Remainder.”  
Deed 4 is where things get interesting. Here, B’s remainder is 
contingent—unless B graduates law school, he cannot take. And because 
B’s remainder is contingent, O holds a reversion (should B fail to meet the 
condition, O will retrieve the property in fee simple absolute). 
Mathematically, the conveyance is “Fee Simple Absolute = Life Estate + 
Reversion + Contingent Remainder.” Take particular note of the 
similarities to Deed 1. In terms of ensuring that all pieces of the Fee Simple 
pie are accounted for, B’s contingent remainder adds nothing. This math 
persists, regardless of whether the destructibility doctrine is in force. Unlike 
its vested cousin, the contingent remainder is unnecessary to account for the 
entirety of the fee simple absolute—a reversion or a vested remainder 
combined with a preceding life estate will always comprise the entire fee 
simple absolute.  
Likewise, a defeasible fee combined with a future interest in the grantor 
or grantee (that is, either a possibility of reverter or power of termination in 
the grantor or an executory interest in the grantee) are in total equal to the 
fee simple absolute. That the contingent remainder is a mere footnote in the 
math of property transfers likely reflects the common-law destructibility 
                                                                                                             
166. See id. at 26 (describing a remainder as vested when the remainderman is born and 
ascertainable, and the remainder becoming a present possessory interest is not subject to a 
condition precedent). 
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doctrine, as well as the common law’s treatment of the contingent 
remainder as a mere “possibility” rather than as a concrete interest.167  
But abolishing the destructibility doctrine does a disservice to this basic 
math. With Deed 4, should B fail to graduate law school by the time of A’s 
life estate expiring, B’s contingent remainder survives if the destructibility 
doctrine is not in place. While O will likely regain the present right to 
possess the land, she now holds what is most easily classified as a 
defeasible fee (more specifically, a fee simple subject to executory 
limitation). B’s contingent remainder, while not formally reclassified, now 
acts as an executory interest, capable of divesting O of her fee simple 
estate. Thus, the “alchemy” of the post-destructibility regime transmogrifies 
the “patient and polite” remainder into the violent, divesting, and 
traditionally indestructible executory interest.
168
  
This result comports with neither common-law nor modern property 
concepts, regardless of destructibility. First, the contingent remainder is 
amplified beyond its traditional confines. It becomes as secure and concrete 
an interest as the vested remainder, if not stronger—the vested remainder, 
unlike this “saved” contingent remainder, does not divest the grantor of 
anything, but rather follows the natural expiration of the preceding, present 
estate. Moreover, preserving the contingent remainder frustrates the 
grantor’s interests at several levels—an ironic outcome, considering the 
destructibility doctrine is typically abolished in the name of the grantor. 
Without destructibility, the grantor’s reversion becomes subordinate to the 
grantee’s contingent remainder.  
This subordination is even more stark in cases of merger. Traditionally, 
component parts of a larger present estate will combine if held by the same 
individual.
169
 Thus, if O conveyed a life estate to A, with a contingent 
remainder in B, and then subsequently sold her reversion to A, A would 
traditionally hold a fee simple absolute, as the reversion would combine 
with the life estate into the fee (as the math shows). But without 
destructibility, everything falls before the contingent remainder. O may still 
sell her reversion to A, but A may only hold the reversion and his present 
life estate separately—and he may still lose his reversion if at some point in 
time B fulfills the condition that limits his remainder. Given that the 
                                                                                                             
167. See id. at 32 (discussing that, at common law, the contingent remainder was an 
insubstantial interest and, thus, was not alienable inter vivos); 2 TIFFANY, supra note 9, § 
320 (“A contingent remainder is merely the possibility or prospect of an estate.”).  
168. See 2 TIFFANY, supra note 9, §§ 317, 364 (noting that remainders do not terminate 
the preceding estate, while executory interests do).  
169. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 9, § 70. 
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reversion is traditionally viewed as a vested interest,
170
 a grantee’s 
contingent future interest defeating a vested interest originally in the grantor 
seems doubly concerning. In fact, this failure to allow merger ultimately 
defeats the grantor’s intent, expressed by her decision to sell the reversion 
to A, the grantee. To paraphrase a maxim from contract law: absent 
destructibility, B receives more than he bargained for.  
These possibilities suggest the presence of at least one broader concern 
with respect to the notion of ownership and autonomy. Grantors who own 
in fee simple absolute hold the most robust bundle of real property rights 
under the Anglo-American property scheme.
171
 An interest in fee simple 
absolute is freely alienable, descendible, and devisable;
172
 it commands the 
highest market value and imbues the owner with the fullest complement of 
powers and privileges.
173
 But modern reforms to old feudal doctrines—
including, for example, the broad-scale elimination of the destructibility 
doctrine from state law—have slowly and subtly chipped away at this 
complement of powers. While a change in the treatment of one type of 
future interest hardly constitutes a national crisis, it does require a 
previously neglected assessment of our state and national conceptions of 
private property (that is, privately-owned land) and the locus of power vis-
à-vis individual ownership and third-party rights holders.  
None of the rationales frequently trotted out adequately address these 
issues. First, the mere fact that the destructibility doctrine is cast as a 
“feudal relic”174 is insufficient reason to abandon it without some debate. 
Legal rules and doctrines devoid of all logic and purpose, due to the 
passage of time or (perhaps) bad policy to begin with, ought not to remain 
on the rolls. But law may yet find new life in the shifting sands of societal 
development, and the original pillars that held it high may be organically 
replaced by new, if different, scaffolding. Purported desuetude, intoned as 
an incantation yet wielded as a blunt scythe, is a feature of the discussion, 
not the entire dialogue itself.  
Moreover, given that property law is fundamentally local in this 
country,
175
 a state-by-state analysis of common-law doctrines may be 
fruitful for determining the efficacy of particular ideas. Part III of this 
                                                                                                             
170. See 2 id. § 311a.  
171. See LAURENCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–3.  
172. Id. 
173. See id. 
174. See Gallanis, supra note 5, at 534 (“[T]he destructibility rule is a feudal relic 
inconsistent with modern law.”). 
175. See 1 TIFFANY, supra note 9, § 1. 
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Comment features such an analysis, tailored specifically to Oklahoma. 
Indeed, even in light of demands that property laws facilitate greater 
interstate commerce, Professor Barros acknowledges that United States 
property law may vary across state boundaries—and that such variance is 
justified and viable.
176
  
Second, the topic of alienability frequently appears in arguments 
favoring reform.
177
 But alienability occurs at multiple levels, and the 
alienability best served by abolition is macro in scale. That is, by 
empowering grantees, abolition ensures that land is likely to change hands 
downstream, to see more owners over a stretch of decades. An egalitarian 
argument
178
 lives within this: treating the contingent remainder as 
indestructible presents opportunities for broadening the class of landowners 
and restricting the concentration of land in a few hands over time.
179
  
But these potential benefits sometimes have downsides for the grantor. 
First, the grantor’s power to alienate her land diminishes without the 
destructibility doctrine. The grantor is bound by the initial conveyance, and 
while the result may ultimately be faithful to her initial intention, 
faithfulness is not guaranteed. Regardless, the grantor is deprived of 
potential future opportunities to dispose of her land as she sees fit. More 
broadly, denying the grantor a second chance to alienate the land denigrates 
the grantor’s capacity for intention. Abolition of the destructibility doctrine 
is, in part, justified on a reified notion of grantor’s intent (or what is 
believed to be that intent). Thus, courts preserve the contingent remainder 
in order to effectuate the grantor’s intent gleaned from the original deed.  
This is a risky business at numerous levels. Courts may interpret the 
language of the instrument incorrectly—the grantor gave a contingent 
remainder, after all, and the face of the deed may not indicate how the 
grantor secretly hoped it would be treated. Moreover, the grantor, simply by 
virtue of being human, has a necessarily dynamic intent. By giving the 
contingent remainder’s limitation new life after the expiration of the 
preceding estate, the grantor thus becomes bound to the “intent” embodied 
                                                                                                             
176. See Barros, supra note 5, at 25–26 (discussing debates over uniformity).  
177. See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 5, at 568 (offering as a proposed reform that all future 
interests shall be freely alienable).  
178. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding as constitutional 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause Hawaii’s program of land redistribution aiming 
at excessive concentration of real property in too few hands).  
179. Conversely, abolishing the destructibility doctrine may chill systemic alienation. 
Presented with fewer options for alienation, the grantor may choose to hold onto his land 
until death, rather than risk the land falling into unexpected hands. 
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by the original deed. But this intent may be stale—circumstances may have 
changed, and the grantor may seek to alienate her property in a different 
way than she initially intended.
180
 Thus, the “grantor’s intent” argument is 
more complex than its typical presentation, and certain feudal doctrines 
may actually do more service to the grantor’s intent, in spite of myriad 
attacks levied against them.  
A larger point lies at the heart of these criticisms: reforms like abolition 
work to both erode property rights and to transfer power away from the 
grantor. Merely by eliminating the destructibility doctrine, the grantor has 
fewer tools by which to convey her land. Nuanced division of real property 
is a hallmark of English and American property law; it is a familiar tenet of 
first-year property to discuss the “bundle of sticks” and the many ways in 
which that bundle can be divided and dispensed.
181
 While simplification of 
the law is an admirable goal, it comes at a cost. Overly simplified systems 
of property subtly deprive the owner—arguably the party the system is 
most interested in protecting—of rights and privileges traditionally enjoyed. 
While modern trends make both vested and contingent remainders 
alienable, for instance, vested and contingent remainders are hardly 
synonymous. And, while placing the words of limitation before (rather than 
after) the words of purchase may seem irrelevant, such placement may truly 
indicate a choice on the part of the grantor, one signaling that the 
contingency is superordinate to the taker’s taking. A system that boils down 
to the black and white of “present interest” and “future interest” loses this 
texture and nuance, making ownership, a fundamentally human activity, 
problematically two-dimensional. 
Ultimately, systems of law are built and arranged around policy choices 
and foundational principles. They represent an application of grander 
notions concerning relationships and power. Thus, the American system—
and certainly Oklahoma’s—should be built around the grantor’s 
foundational power, as an expression of society’s broader notions of 
individual autonomy, freedom, and private ownership. Just as the plaintiff 
is the master of her claim
182
 and the offeror master of her offer,
183
 so too 
                                                                                                             
180. Cf. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting 
that an offer will lapse after a “reasonable time,” or after the period for acceptance that the 
offeror has specified in the offer).  
181. See CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 17, at 2–3.  
182. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (noting that the well-
pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff “the master of the claim”).  
183. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 cmt. a (“The offeror is the master of 
his offer.”).  
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should the grantor be master of her house.
184
 Public policy may still have 
something to say about tying up title over decades and centuries (as with 
the abolition of the fee tail and the discussion of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities), but the grantor should have a kaleidoscopic selection of 
alienation tools at her disposal, rather than checking “Column A” or 
“Column B.” Oklahoma’s grander ideas and political theories may offer 
justifications for such a selection.  
III. Saving Feudal Doctrines Through Oklahoma History 
This Part examines “first principles,” both at the national and state level, 
as vehicles for reinvigorating and justifying anew common-law property 
concepts. Specifically, certain vestiges of feudal property law may find new 
life in the idiosyncratic history of Oklahoma. Admitted to statehood in 
1907,
185
 Oklahoma wrestled with cultural and ideological tensions from the 
late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries.
186
 From these tensions 
emerged unique conceptions of land ownership, autonomy, and political 
power—marriages between farmers burning with Christian fervor and 
Socialist organizers drawing on a movement that was avowedly anti-
religious.
187
 But such alliances of strange bedfellows arose for a reason: a 
yearning for the opportunity and self-actualization that was said to be the 
American birthright.
188
 And seemingly incongruous political relationships 
drew from an ideological palette that was fundamentally American, 
providing the critical, interstitial adhesion between competing viewpoints 
and lifestyles. In this historical moment, with churning discourse, property 
law may avoid the crush of withering criticism, instead finding its phoenix-
like rebirth.
189
 
                                                                                                             
184. Yes, this is the second musical reference of the article—this time from Les 
Misérables. See Jennifer Butt & Leo Burmester, Master of the House, on HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
LES MISÉRABLES (MCA/Verve 2003).  
185. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 177. 
186. See JIM BISSETT, AGRARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA: MARX, JEFFERSON, AND JESUS 
IN THE OKLAHOMA COUNTRYSIDE, 1904–1920, at 7 (1999).  
187. See id. at 85–104. 
188. See id. at 11–12. 
189. Part III’s argument is admittedly a white history of Oklahoma. Engaged dialogue 
about the experiences of both Native Americans and blacks in Oklahoma must be had, 
particularly with regard to land ownership; unfortunately, such dialogue is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. Additionally, Part III’s argument is offered as merely one option, and in 
many ways, it focuses on the history of predominately white settlers because their 
experiences best comport with this Comment’s overarching goal of providing alternative 
grounds for justifying the common law of property. Rich and nuanced debates may be had 
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The story begins with Thomas Jefferson. Beyond his political 
accomplishments, Jefferson was the ideological godfather of a diffuse, 
egalitarian vision of American democracy, where power was local and the 
farmer was the country’s ideal citizen.190 The semi-subsistence, republican 
yeoman farmer, in Jefferson’s eyes, received strength and intellectual 
emancipation through his land, which allowed him to reach “virtuous, 
independent political judgments.”191 These “honest, moderately prosperous, 
and productive toilers” were the country’s backbone, clear-eyed and 
rational, in contrast with industrial laborers and urban workers, whose 
dependence on others clouded their judgment.
192
 These yeomen provided 
one rationale for Jefferson’s signature domestic achievement: the Louisiana 
Purchase, from which Oklahoma was carved.
193
 In the Purchase, Jefferson 
saw an opportunity for an eternal agrarian republic founded on the small 
land holder,
194
 who was “the most precious part of a state.”195 In his thought 
and legacy, then, Jefferson represented the dream of individual autonomy, 
self-reliance, and economic opportunity, all within a landscape (ideally) 
devoid of wide disparities in property ownership and the crippling 
inequalities that followed such disparity.
196
 
Jefferson’s views on land and citizenship found their way into public 
policy in postbellum (and pre-statehood) Oklahoma. Following the Civil 
War, the United States government began a process of seizing lands held by 
Native Americans, often to resettle tribes that had not lived in Oklahoma 
prior to the post-war period.
197
 However, a tract of land located in the center 
of the territory, formerly held by the Creeks and Seminoles, remained 
unsettled; it was these “Unassigned Lands” that became the beacon of 
westward expansion for earnest settlers looking to make their own way.
198
 
                                                                                                             
about whether the Native American property philosophy, which was far more communal and 
non-commercial, might lead to more convincing alternatives to the common law—perhaps 
even alternatives decidedly against reform proposals such as those suggested by Professors 
Gallanis and Barros. See generally DANNEY GOBLE, PROGRESSIVE OKLAHOMA: THE MAKING 
OF A NEW KIND OF STATE 44–47 (1980). 
190. See WILENTZ, supra note 2, at 47–48.  
191. See id. at 47.  
192. Id. at 47–48.  
193. See id. at 109–12.  
194. Id. at 111. 
195. THOMAS JEFFERSON, II.7 To Rev. James Madison, in JEFFERSON: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 105, 107 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).  
196. See id.  
197. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17.  
198. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141, 147; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
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And these settlers hung their hopes immediately on an existing federal 
statute: the Homestead Act.
199
  
Signed into law by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, the Homestead Act 
opened lands owned by the federal government to private settlement.
200
 
Citizens could file claims for up to a quarter section—160 acres of land—
which they would own outright after living on and improving their plot for 
five years.
201
 When the federal government initially maintained that the 
Unassigned Lands fell outside the Act’s purview,202 hopes turned to 
pressure, epitomized by the “Boomer” movement of the late nineteenth 
century.
203
 The relentless Boomer “invasions” of Oklahoma—along with a 
grander desire by Midwesterners for agrarian settlement and commercial 
development—finally wore down the federal government’s resistance;204 in 
1889, Congress amended the Indian Appropriations Act
205
 to open the 
Unassigned Lands for settlement.
206
 Pursuant to the amendment, Oklahoma 
opened its doors at high noon on April 22, 1889 in the now-famous Land 
Run.
207
 
The policy of private ownership became pervasive following this initial 
giveaway, and the primary targets after the first Land Run were the Indian 
reservations across the territory.
208
 Enabled by the Dawes Act,
209
 the federal 
government broke up communally-owned tribal lands and distributed them 
as 160-acre allotments to individual Native Americans.
210
 As tribal 
populations tended to be small, this process often—and unsurprisingly—
left surplus acreage for government ownership after distribution, and this 
                                                                                                             
199. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141. 
200. Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (repealed 1976)); see also BAIRD & 
GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
201. See Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (repealed 1976)); see also 
BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. The Homestead Act 
itself was inspired by Jeffersonian themes of westward expansion and poverty relief through 
more egalitarian land ownership. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE 
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 1995).  
202. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 141–42; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
203. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 142; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
204. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 143–44; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
205. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012); BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
206. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 144–45. The amendment effectively paid off the 
Creeks and Seminoles to ensure there were no unresolved claims to the land and empowered 
the president to set a time for settlers to enter Oklahoma. Id. at 144. 
207. See id. at 144–45; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 17. 
208. See BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 145; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.  
209. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (repealed 2000); BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
210. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 153; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
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acreage became fertile territory for additional settlements under the 
Homestead Act.
211
 By the turn of the century, this homesteading had 
resulted in twin territories in modern-day Oklahoma: the Oklahoma 
Territory, comprising the state’s central and western half, and the remaining 
Indian territory, comprising the eastern lands held by the Five Civilized 
Tribes.
212
  
Exempted from the Dawes Act, the Five Tribes maintained a unique 
relationship with the federal government, which formally recognized their 
tribal governments.
213
 But as settlers continued to flow into Oklahoma, 
forces inside and outside the state pushed to open the Indian territory for 
settlement.
214
 This clamoring culminated in the Curtis Act,
215
 which offered 
the Five Tribes a no-win situation: either they would dissolve their 
governments and divide their lands, or the federal government would do it 
for them.
216
 The Five Tribes relented, proceeding to adopt the “civilized” 
policy of private ownership by divvying up their communal lands among 
their members.
217
 By the eve of statehood in 1907, Oklahoma had shed 
competing land ownership arrangements in favor of the homestead ideal, 
with the small landholder emerging as central to the state’s ethos.  
This “yeomen” focus also pervaded one of the more unique political 
movements in Oklahoma’s history—the rise (and fall) of the state’s 
Socialist Party.
218
 The Socialist Party—always a minority movement in the 
United States—arguably found its strongest iteration in turn-of-the-century 
Oklahoma, reaching its acme during the 1910s.
219
 The state party derived 
much of its strength from its recognition of agrarian anxieties, offering hope 
in the face of national neglect for non-industrial workers.
220
 With a 
membership heavily comprised of farmers and agricultural laborers, 
Oklahoma socialists aimed to realize the American Dream through a 
nuanced, multifaceted indictment of commercial exploitation and class 
conflict.
221
 Consequently, the Party fused political and cultural 
crosscurrents into a unique theory tailor-made for the region, drawing 
                                                                                                             
211. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 146, 153; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
212. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 163–64; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
213. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 153; see BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
214. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 155; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18.  
215. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (repealed 2000); BAIRD & GOBBLE, supra note 3, at 156. 
216. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 156; see BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
217. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 155–56; BISSETT, supra note 186, at 18. 
218. See BISSETT, supra note 186.  
219. See id. at 3.  
220. See id. at xv, 5.  
221. See id. at 7–8.  
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heavily from three particular areas: “(1) the Jeffersonian emphasis on the 
common man, the dignity of labor, and the importance of the land . . . (2) 
the scathing indictment of capitalism set down by Karl Marx . . . and (3) the 
evangelical Protestant tradition that had been central to the American 
experience since the Great Revival of the early nineteenth century.”222 
Together, the “Marxist message of class conflict,” “Jeffersonian promise of 
yeoman democracy,” and “moral authority of Christianity” proved a potent 
organizational platform and ultimately infected the state’s entire political 
discourse, framing the arguments made by both Republicans and Democrats 
seeking office.
223
 
The driving force behind the Party’s success and strife was one 
omnipresent object: land.
224
 Low crop prices in the early twentieth century 
sharply increased the ranks of tenant farmers;
225
 by 1910, tenants 
outnumbered landowners in Oklahoma, with the average rate of tenancy at 
fifty-five percent and nearing ninety percent in certain counties.
226
 This 
reality was particularly odious given that Oklahomans viewed farming as an 
idyllic and quintessentially American pursuit.
227
  
Into the breach stepped the Socialist Party. Seizing upon the ideological 
innovations of preceding organizations and movements,
228
 the Party sought 
to address two central issues for skeptical small farmers: (1) whether a party 
generally opposed to private property would support farmers owning their 
lands and (2) whether the party’s organizational structure would reflect the 
egalitarian tones of its platform.
229
 Oklahoma socialists quickly realized 
                                                                                                             
222. Id. at 7.  
223. Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 7 n.4 (“Oklahoma socialists inherited a reverence for the 
Jeffersonian ideals of democracy and the importance of the yeoman farming class for the 
maintenance of the American democratic tradition.”).  
224. See id. at 11–12, 62. 
225. See id. at 9–10.  
226. See id. at 11.  
227. Bissett offers the following assessment:  
To this majority of Oklahoma farmers, the crisis on the land was made all the 
more objectionable by the exalted position farmers were purported to occupy in 
American society. All farmers, even the most impoverished tenants, had 
internalized the Jeffersonian notion that yeoman farmers represented the 
bedrock of American democracy. Yet the dream of yeoman democracy, 
portrayed in glowing terms by countless politicians attempting to invoke 
Jefferson’s memory, conflicted with the life experiences of those involved in 
the labor of farming. 
Id. at 11-13.  
228. See id. at 22–23, 61–64 (discussing Indiahoma Farmers’ Alliance). 
229. See id. at 60–62.  
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that communal ownership of farmlands was neither politically nor 
ideologically advantageous, developing instead a political philosophy that 
addressed systemic inequalities through greater diffusion of land 
ownership.
230
 Far from being the utopian end-goal, land collectivization 
embodied the specter of tenancy for Oklahoma farmers.
231
  
Thus, the Socialist Party resolved the central tension between the 
“Marxist demand for land collectivization [and] the Jeffersonian ideal of 
autonomous yeomen farmers” by calling for wholesale ownership reform: 
only by “returning the land to those who worked it” could the state’s 
broader inequalities be cured.
232
 By 1912, the Party officially supported 
redistribution of farmland to tenants in an effort to expand the ranks of 
owners in Oklahoma.
233
 The party structure also reflected this broadening 
of the “property franchise,” with calls for democratization met by 
decentralized power and a more egalitarian framework to complement the 
“yeomen” focus of the Party.234 While the Socialist Party of Oklahoma 
declined abruptly following the First World War,
235
 its ideals did not die 
out—indeed, they reflected the more institutional forces that had 
culminated in the state’s constitution just a few years earlier.236 
Conclusion 
What does any of this have to do with property law derived from feudal 
England? In one sense, not a great deal—but in a more significant sense, 
more than one might think. Law is ultimately an expression of policy 
positions and competing conceptions of the societal good; it speaks in a 
language that flows from the broad notions that structure and govern a 
given polity. Oklahoma offers source material for these notions. Themes of 
individual land ownership, egalitarianism, and hard-earned economic 
opportunity abound in Oklahoma’s early social and political history. These 
                                                                                                             
230. See id. at 66 (noting how an Oklahoma newspaper editor “effortlessly combined a 
Marxist understanding of the agricultural crisis . . . with Jefferson’s tenet that only through 
freehold tenure could a measure of equality be attained in American society”).  
231. See id. at 67. 
232. Id.  
233. See id. at 68.  
234. See id. at 82–84.  
235. BAIRD & GOBLE, supra note 3, at 182–83. 
236. Oklahoma’s constitution was looked at as the ideal of the American Progressive 
movement. Specifically, the constitution struck out against monopolization, and it eliminated 
restrictions on land such as primogeniture, entailments, and multigenerational encumbrances 
on title. See GOBLE, supra note 189, at 214-18.  
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themes, when juxtaposed against prevailing property law, offer a new 
rationale for doctrines and classifications lambasted as useless and archaic.  
Compare this notion to modern proposals for property law reform. 
Contemporary reforms aim to make the system more efficient, simpler, and 
clearer. Moreover, the reforms operate on the idea that the grantor’s intent 
is the North Star for construing deeds, with society’s general preference for 
free alienability and marketability of property interests acting as important 
background information for this intent.  
Yet the reforms seem to culminate in disparate results. Abrogating the 
destructibility doctrine, for instance, may promote land alienability—it 
increases the likelihood real property will end up in the hands of someone 
other than the grantor—but it alienates at the cost of the grantor’s intent, 
which is the paramount factor in land transactions. Conversely, chipping 
away at the Rule Against Perpetuities empowers the grantor to tie up her 
land for multiple generations—but this of course leaves less land for 
market, stunting alienability in the long term. Further, ever-simpler menus 
of future interests mean the grantor is left with fewer options by which to 
divide her land, even though such division—temporally, conceptually, 
physically—is a hallmark of the Anglo-American system of law. Thus, 
even if things like intent and alienability should guide legal policymaking, 
it is not at all clear that the reforms up for consideration today actually 
accomplish these goals.  
Feudal doctrines recast in light of regional “first principles,” like those of 
Oklahoma, however, may serve as potential agents for the two central goals 
of modern property law—effectuating the intent of the grantor and 
promoting the alienability of land. While scholars castigate the 
destructibility doctrine as an unjustified handmaiden of the outmoded 
“abeyance in seisin,” Oklahomans may find use in this doctrine as a tool 
both for empowering the landholder who reigns supreme in the state’s 
mythology and ensuring that the state’s policy favoring alienation remains 
rooted in the notion that the “grantor as owner” is the fundamental locus of 
power and authority vis-à-vis real property. Likewise, the Rule Against 
Perpetuities takes on new meaning as a policy statement contextualizing 
land transactions in Oklahoma; drawing on its constitutional foundations, 
the Rule announces an overarching societal judgment against the dead hand 
of the past and long-range encumbrances on title. And rather than an echo 
from England’s feudal past, the Rule may now be viewed as an outgrowth 
of the state’s rugged individualism, its belief that man ought to be self-
made and wealth ought to flow freely among citizens instead of 
accumulating over time in fewer and fewer hands. Even the classificatory 
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scheme of present estates, the allegedly tedious and meaningless 
distinctions between the power of termination and the possibility of 
reverter, might survive unscathed, its complexity now acknowledged as a 
rich heterogeneity that offers the landowner a panoply of options by which 
she may interact with her property. Run the steady standbys of property law 
through this new, state-specific framework and see what sticks—the old 
“relics” of feudalism may find new life yet on the American frontier. 
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